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Abstract and Keywords
This chapter presents a re-understanding of the contents of our analog 
magnitude representations (e.g., approximate duration, distance, number). The 
approximate number system (ANS) is considered, which supports numerical 
representations that are widely described as fuzzy, noisy, and limited in their 
representational power. The contention is made that these characterizations are 
largely based on misunderstandings—that what has been called “noise” and 
“fuzziness” is actually an important epistemic signal of confidence in one’s 
estimate of the value. Rather than the ANS having noisy or fuzzy numerical 
content, it is suggested that the ANS has exquisitely precise numerical content 
that is subject to epistemic limitations. Similar considerations will arise for other 
analog representations. The chapter discusses how this new understanding of 
ANS representations recasts the learnability problem for number and the 
conceptual changes that children must accomplish in the number domain.
Keywords:   approximate number system, conceptual change, analog magnitude representations, 
confidence, representational power
Introduction
A focus on conceptual change has the benefit that it motivates us to become 
clearer about our models of the starting states for learning, the later states for 
cognition, and the learning mechanisms (and input) that may be required for 
conceptual change to occur. In this chapter I will discuss a family of starting 
states—representations of analog magnitudes such as the approximate number 
system. I will motivate an adjustment to our understanding of these 
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representations, and I will briefly explore how this adjustment may change the 
theories we build for conceptual changes involving analog magnitudes.
Throughout, I will be concerned with magnitude representations, which include 
representations of approximate duration (e.g., what does 1.5 seconds feel like?), 
approximate distance (e.g., how far is it between me and the wall?), and 
approximate number (e.g., around how many people were at the party?), among 
many others (e.g., volume, area, brightness, loudness—e.g., Dehaene … 
Brannon, 2011; Feigenson, 2007; Odic et al., 2015). The mental representations 
of these dimensions share a similar format and they give rise to similar 
behavioral signatures (e.g., Weber’s law) as indexed by psychological 
experiments. I will describe a model for these representations, discuss a 
confusion we may fall prey to when theorizing about them, and present a 
positive proposal for replacing these notions with the notion of epistemic 
limitations.
 (p.172) There is a long history of studying magnitude representations, and 
recent decades have seen an explosion of interest across multiple approaches, 
including animal behavior, studies of infant cognition, brain imaging, 
neuropsychology, and single-unit recording (Dehaene … Brannon, 2011). Some 
shared beliefs about magnitudes seem to inform the work in these various 
disciplines. While variation exists, a common notion is that magnitude 
representations (e.g., representations of nonsymbolic number) are approximate 
or “noisy,” and this noise is a limiting factor for their expressive power. For 
example, numerical representations are described as subserved by, “underlying 
representations (that) are inherently continuous and therefore noisy and 
variable” (Leslie, Gelman, … Gallistel, 2008a), and that “each numerosity is 
represented internally by a noisy distribution of activation on an internal 
continuum or mental number line” (Dehaene, 2007). Indeed, the “noisiness” of 
representations of number, space, and time is often taken to be their hallmark 
signature. In what follows I suggest a critical adjustment to this understanding. I 
believe that what I will argue applies to all analog magnitude representations. 
Throughout, I will focus my examples primarily on representations of numerical 
magnitude stemming from the approximate number system (ANS), but I mean 
for my points to apply broadly.
A Standard Model of Analog Magnitude Representations
Claims about noisy, approximate, or fuzzy representations can be easier to 
interpret with the aid of a graphical depiction of the analog representations. 
Figure 10.1 offers a fairly typical depiction of the representations of the ANS. 
The mental number line along the bottom is often described as representing an 
array of number sensitive neurons, each with a preferential tuning function (e.g.,
Nieder … Miller, 2003). The width of these tuning functions increases with the 
numerical target, with the result being a series of bell-shaped curves that 
linearly increase in standard deviation with increasing signal (e.g., reading from 
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left to right in Figure 10.1). Often each bell-shaped curve is understood to 
indicate a representation of a particular numerosity within the ANS. It would not 
be uncommon for authors to make statements such as “the curve representing 4 
is sharper than the curve representing 8.” Here, a “sharper” curve is typically 
understood to be a more accurate representation; similarly, the representation 
for, say, 8 is typically taken to contain more error than the representation for, 
say, 4. I will argue that these notions do capture something important about 
analog magnitude representations, but that they also embrace a crucial 
misunderstanding of these representations.
The constant increase in the width of the bell-shaped activations as the to-be-
represented numerosity increases is an important, law-like aspect of these 
representations. As one moves from the left to the right along the x-axis in 
Figure 10.1, the numerical value of the signal is increasing. As the bell-shaped 
representations take on larger and larger numerical values (e.g., as determined 
by the mean of their activations), the standard deviation (SD) of these curves 
increases (e.g., with wider spread for larger numbers).  (p.173) This constant 
increase in SD provides an account for the major performance signature in 
behaviors that rely on the ANS—for example, the discriminability of any two 
numbers in the ANS is a function of their ratio. Graphically, this can be seen as 
the amount of overlap between two curves. Intuitively, where two curves overlap 
on the mental number line, their representations will tend to be confused by the 
observer trying to distinguish them. The more overlap there is among the 
curves, the more error there will be in judgments—for instance, when 
attempting to decide which of two collections is greater in number, the observer 
will increasingly struggle as the numbers become closer. For example, because 
there is less overlap between the ANS representations activated for five vs. six 
dots than eight vs. nine dots, performance will be more reliable with the former 
comparison. Analogous notions of bell-shaped representations underlie 
theorizing about all other analog magnitudes as well; for example, the spread of 
the curves representing durations increase as the times become longer (Odic, 
Im, et al., 2015).
One feature of the 
psychophysical model sketched 
graphically here is that the rate 
of increase in SD as number 
increases can be described by a 
single parameter (the Weber 
fraction) that determines the SD 
for each internal number 
representation (Halberda … 
Odic, 2014). This model also 
allows us to describe individual differences in performance: Individuals differ in 
their accuracy at a numerical discrimination task to the extent that they have 
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Figure 10.1  Depiction of the 
representations of the approximate 
number system (ANS).
different Weber fractions and 
thereby different rates of 
increasing spread in their ANS 
representations, with more 
spread leading to more errors. 
Thus, we can understand individual differences in performance in terms of the 
Weber fraction. If the Weber fraction is higher, it means that the confusability of 
the number representations increases more rapidly as number increases (e.g., 
larger SDs and wider curves). If the Weber fraction is lower, it means that the 
confusability of the number representations increases more slowly as number 
increases (e.g., smaller SDs and narrower curves). Different animals (Brannon … 
Roitman, 2003), and humans of different ages or abilities  (p.174) (Halberda … 
Feigenson, 2008; Piazza et al., 2010) exhibit different Weber fractions, but all 
participants show performance consistent with the lawful increase in SD—for 
example, all observers have representations similar to those depicted in Figure 
10.1, just with wider or narrower bell-shaped curves.
Spread in Analog Magnitude Representations Does Not Indicate Error
How are we to understand the curved representations in Figure 10.1? What does 
the spread of the curves actually indicate? One understanding is that the curves 
depict the amount of error in each representation. For example, one might 
suggest that sometimes the observer’s representation of ANS8 (e.g., a 
representation generated by the ANS in response to a stimulus presentation of 
eight items) gets it correct and responds “8,” but a significant amount of the 
time gets it a little wrong and says “7,” and more rarely it gets it really wrong 
and says “5.”
This understanding—curves as errors in the representation—can also be applied 
to performance in a numerical discrimination task. For example, one might 
expect that the observer in a numerical discrimination task will at some point be 
incapable of discriminating between two close numerosities. Unreliable 
discrimination performance is often understood as arising because the error in 
the two analog magnitude representations being compared makes them 
indistinguishable. For instance, it is not uncommon to read statements such as 
“because analog magnitude representations are inexact and subject to Weber 
fraction considerations, they fail to capture small numerical differences between 
large numbers” (Carey, 2009, p. 294), and “the difference between eight and 
nine is not experienced at all, since eight and nine, like any higher successive 
numerical values, cannot be discriminated” (Carey, 2009, p. 295). These appear 
to be claims about the representational capacities of the ANS and the thoughts 
and experiences it supports, not simply statements about an animal’s 
performance in some task.
Epistemic Limitations and Precise Estimates in Analog Magnitude Representation
Page 5 of 24
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All 
Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.  
Subscriber: Johns Hopkins University; date: 14 February 2020
This view can also be seen in the assumption that performance in a numerical 
discrimination task should drop to chance (i.e., should result in an inability to 
discriminate) when the ratio between numbers makes them indistinguishable to 
the observer. For instance, it is not uncommon to read statements such as “when 
the ratio of two magnitudes exceeds that allowed by the subject’s Weber 
constant, the quantities become indiscriminable for the subject” (Beck, 2012), or 
“two sets can be discriminated only if they differ by a given numerical ratio, 
according to Weber’s law” (Piazza, 2010). Here, too, authors appear to suggest 
that this limitation is fundamental to the representations themselves.
The suggestion I make here, and in other work, is that such beliefs likely reflect 
a common misunderstanding of the psychophysical law (Halberda … Odic, 
2014). In fact, the psychophysical law predicts that the observer will be above 
chance for all comparisons, even the most difficult, barring performance or 
attention limitations. Indeed, even the unfortunate term “just noticeable 
difference,” often used to refer to the smallest difference  (p.175) between two 
stimuli that an observer can reliably detect, does not actually denote a just 
noticeable difference—because observers’ actual performance will be above 
chance with discriminations that are both above and below their JND (Halberda 
… Odic, 2014).
Instead, I suggest that the Weber fraction is better understood to be a kind of 
internal scaling factor that reflects the rate of increase in spread of the 
representations along a particular psychological dimension (e.g., the mental 
number line, area line, or duration line). The Weber fraction determines the SD 
for every possible representation of that dimension, not simply performance at 
some particular ratio (Halberda … Odic, 2014). Because the representations 
along the mental dimensions of analog magnitudes are well-ordered and any two 
representations have some degree of non-overlap, the psychophysical model 
predicts that all numbers can, in principle, be distinguished (even through, in 
practice, with very large numbers it might take very many trials for an 
observer’s performance to yield enough data to show this).
To connect the current discussion back to the broader goals of understanding 
starting states and conceptual change, I note that these beliefs about error in 
ANS representations have had some impact on the theories we have built. For 
example, Jake Beck has reasoned from a supposed inability to discriminate close 
numbers in an ANS task to a hypothesis that analog magnitude representations 
have nonconceptual content (as opposed to conceptual content) and that they 
violate systematicity (Beck, 2012).1 Susan Carey has constructed several fully 
worked-out proposals for how children might move from ANS representations, in 
combination with other primitive non-integer number concepts, to build a new 
conceptual understanding of the integers (Carey, 2009). These proposals, and 
others in the literature, assume that ANS representations do not distinguish 
between close numbers. This is one corollary of the broader view that the 
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Figure 10.2  Two performance patterns 
and two theoretical curves. a: Plotting of 
average performance from over 10,000 
people between the ages of 10 and 85 
who participated in a numerical 
discrimination task. b: Replotting of a 
dataset from a single pigeon who was a 
“noisiness” of analog magnitude representations amounts to “fuzzy” or “error-
prone” representations. Here I suggest that this understanding is mistaken, and 
offer a positive proposal for how to think about these representations.
Evidence from Human and Animal Success with Close Comparisons
In considering the suggestion that ANS representations fail to distinguish 
between close numbers, we should first examine the empirical evidence. This 
examination reveals that, typically, no such failure occurs. Figure 10.2 shows two 
performance patterns and two theoretical curves. The first dataset (Figure 
10.2a) shows the average performance from over 10,000 people between the 
ages of 10 and 85 who participated in a numerical discrimination task (i.e., 
deciding which of two briefly flashed collections of dots was greater in number) 
(Halberda, Ly, Wilmer, Naiman, … Germine, 2012). Throughout the task, the 
numbers of items in the two collections, and their ratio, varied so that some 
trials were easier and some were harder. This allows us to generate estimates of 
how well the observers performed across four different numerical ratios. In 
Figure 10.2a we see that  (p.176) human performance (circles) does not drop to 
chance (50%) as the ratio becomes harder. Rather, performance shows a smooth 
change from better on easier trials (e.g., a ratio of 2, where there might be 20 
yellow and 10 blue dots) to less good on harder trials (e.g., a ratio of 1.143, 
where there might be 7 yellow and 8 blue dots). Every one of the more than 
10,000 participants showed performance consistent with this kind of smooth 
gradual change. Critically, this smooth gradual change is exactly what is 
predicted by Weber’s law—not an abrupt change from “above chance” to “at 
chance” performance (Halberda … Odic, 2014). In many other studies across 
multiple labs, human participants have been tested on a wide range of numerical 
ratios (including ratios more difficult than those displayed in Figure 10.2a). 
Across these studies, it is the exception to see performance dropping down to 
chance at some point before a ratio of 1. Instead, we almost always see the 
smooth and gradual change in performance seen in Figure 10.2.
The curve in Figure 10.2a is the 
predicted performance based 
on the model of the ANS shown 
in Figure 10.1. It shows smooth 
and gradual change in 
performance from a ratio of 1 
(where the two collections have 
the same number of items, the 
ratio is 1, and there is no 
correct answer) toward better 
and better performance as ratio 
becomes easier. To connect this 
curve of percent correct to the 
bell-shaped curved representations of Figure 10.1, notice that the curves in 
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participant in one of the earliest papers 
on the ANS and numerical discrimination.
Figure 10.1 have no abrupt 
change in their widths. There is 
a smooth and gradual change in 
SD with the increasing number 
signal. The mean of each curve shifts to the right, and the movement right is 
proportional to change in SD. This is Weber’s law, and this smooth change in SD 
and mean is why the predicted performance in Figure 10.2a is smooth with no 
abrupt change in percent correct. Weber’s law is a law about the smooth change 
in SD with increasing signal, and not a law about a “just noticeable difference” 
or at-chance performance at some ratio. Indeed, if participants dropped to 
chance before reaching a ratio of 1 (e.g., as might happen at more difficult ratios 
than those shown in Figure 10.2), or if participants showed some abrupt change 
in percent correct (e.g., from good to bad performance), than these would be 
violations of Weber’s law and we would require some other mathematical model 
to describe such performance.  (p.177) Note that such violations might indeed 
occur, as might happen with performance limitations (e.g., giving up on the task 
when it becomes too tiresome). If such violations occurred due to performance 
factors, then we may still say that Weber’s law holds. Still, the data from the 
more than 10,000 participants in Figure 10.2a demonstrate that such violations 
are not the typical case.2
The second dataset, in Figure 10.2b, is a replotting of a dataset from a single 
pigeon who was a participant in one of the earliest papers on the ANS and 
numerical discrimination (Rilling … McDiarmid, 1965). I include this plot to 
show the performance of a nonhuman animal, and to demonstrate that a belief in 
error-prone representations, and “at chance” performance, is also misplaced for 
animal data. In Figure 10.2b we see that the pigeon’s choices show a smooth 
change with decreasing numerical ratio (never showing an abrupt change and 
never dropping to chance performance), and we can also see the smoothness of 
the predicted performance as fit by the model of Weber’s law. The smoothness of 
this function, as it approaches the intersection with the axes at ratio = 1, reveals 
that the pigeon’s numerical discrimination behavior is consistent with the 
psychophysical model that maintains that consecutive higher numbers are well-
ordered all the way up and down (e.g., the pigeon’s behavior is consistent with 
the assertion that it even knows that 47 < 50; Rilling … McDiarmid, 1965). The 
pigeon’s performance suggests that it is attempting to make the correct 
numerical discrimination even on the most difficult trials. Note that even a 
numerical difference that the pigeon struggles to distinguish (≈70% correct at 
45 vs. 50, ratio 1.11, Figure 10.2b) is nonetheless well-ordered in its 
competence. The evidence for this is that its smoothly decreasing performance 
continues to fall along the psycophysical curve; if the pigeon’s ANS 
representations were not well-ordered, we would see a deviation from Weber’s 
law at these harder ratios Figure 10.2b.
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I believe that even human infants’ performance is best understood to be 
consistent with Weber’s law—that infants’ discrimination abilities are a function 
of ratio, and that they have the competence to succeed with all comparisons, 
even the most difficult ratios, barring attention or performance limitations. 
Melissa Libertus and colleagues (e.g., Libertus … Brannon, 2009) have begun to 
identify smooth, ratio-dependent looking-time performance in infants that is 
consistent with the smooth curves depicted in Figure 10.2. Showing that infants 
succeed at discriminating between numerical quantities that have previously 
been described as being “indiscriminable” at certain ages may require changes 
in numbers of trials and/or experimental design, but it is, I predict, quite 
possible.3
A Performance/Competence Distinction for Analog Magnitude 
Discrimination Behavior
The distinction between understanding participant behavior as involving 
performance errors rather than competence failures may be crucial for our 
theorizing about conceptual development involving analog magnitude 
representations. As learners, the hypotheses we  (p.178) can form depend 
primarily on our competence; testing hypotheses through observation and 
gathering evidence depends on both our competence and our performance. For 
example, if human and animal behavior in numerical discrimination tasks is best 
understood to engage a system of well-ordered representations (the use of which 
is sometimes affected by performance failures), then the thought “I bet that 9 is 
bigger than 8” is thinkable by a creature which, upon seeing two collections of 
items, is only slightly better than chance at deciding which collection has more. 
That is, although performance errors involving the ANS may spell trouble for 
one’s behavior when discriminating close numbers, these performance errors do 
not block precise thoughts about such numbers.4
As an analogy, consider our intuitive understanding of biology that supports 
thoughts such as “that cow is alive” and “that boulder is not alive.” It can 
happen that our ability to distinguish a cow from a boulder can be disrupted by 
external noise. Such events happen on dark and foggy nights—one can imagine 
walking through a foggy field illuminated by just a sliver of moon and seeing a 
large, somewhat amorphous dark shape about 15 paces ahead in the field. We 
might not be able to discriminate much better than chance whether this object is 
a boulder or a sleepy cow. But this performance problem gives rise to no 
problems for our intuitive theories. This event doesn’t lead us to a positive belief 
that cows and boulders are the same. One reason that it does not cause a 
problem for our theories about cows and boulders is that, standing in that field, 
we very much know that we can’t tell whether what stands before us is a cow or 
a boulder. We have a clear sense of our own epistemic limitations. I believe that 
there is also a clear signal of epistemic limitation that plays a crucial role in how 
we use and understand our own analog magnitude thoughts, and I will try to 
Epistemic Limitations and Precise Estimates in Analog Magnitude Representation
Page 9 of 24
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All 
Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.  
Subscriber: Johns Hopkins University; date: 14 February 2020
make the case here that epistemic limitation should replace our notions of error 
in these representations.
Analog Magnitude Representations Are Epistemically Limited Estimates 
with Precise Content
As a first step toward rethinking our views of magnitude representations, we 
might ask: Considering the curves in Figure 10.1, depicting the representations 
of the ANS—are these “noisy” curves spread out within the number space? Is the 
representation of ANS9 more spread out, more diffuse, in the number space than 
the representation of ANS5? Or, more generally, should we infer from the graded 
nature of the ANS activation curves in Figure 10.1 that our representation of 
number itself is graded? Is our approximate number content “fuzzy,” “noisy,” or 
somehow imprecise? I will answer “no” to all of these questions and instead 
suggest that our analog magnitude representations are exquisitely precise, but 
subject to epistemic limitations.5
To make my case, I will present a thought experiment from the spatial domain. 
Data demonstrating “fuzzy” representations of magnitude and position are well 
developed in the space literature (compared to more recent and smaller 
literatures on approximate  (p.179) number, area, duration, etc.). And, space is 
a helpful choice because humans can easily manipulate our own position in 
space (e.g., by walking) and can manipulate our own sensory input (e.g., by 
closing our eyes). Our sense of distance and movement in space—being one of 
our most visceral daily experiences—gives rise to some of our clearest intuitions. 
I believe that the points I will make here should apply to all analog magnitude 
representations (e.g., space, time, number, brightness, loudness, felt weight).
Consider you are standing in a room, in a specific position with an unobstructed 
path to one of the walls. (You can imagine this situation, but I think this example 
works much better if you actually physically do this at some point; I urge the 
reader to try this activity to feel the experiences I describe here). Position 
yourself facing the somewhat distant wall (around 9–15 feet away is a good 
distance for this example) with your eyes open and looking at the unobstructed 
path you have to the wall. Many experiments, such as recording from neurons in 
humans who are preparing to undergo brain surgery (e.g., Ekstrom et al., 2003) 
and in rats who are freely exploring a circular arena (e.g., O’Keefe … Nadel, 
1978), show that you will have an active representation of your position in the 
room and the distance between you and the wall. Your representation of your 
position in space will be very similar to the curve-like representations for 
number in Figure 10.1, with a noisy curve of activation over an approximate 
spatial location and distance, but with the activation for position occurring 
within a virtual two-dimensional floor plane representation rather than the one-
dimensional mental number line. This representation of approximate location 
forms a rough circle or oval-shaped bump of activation on a sort of two-
dimensional map (Jeffery, 2007; O’Keefe … Nadel, 1978). Such a representation 
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of distance and position in space can be understood as quite similar to an ANS 
representation of number—for example, an ANS representation is a rough 
number estimate, a spatial representation is a rough position estimate. I will 
take these spatial representations to be good examples of magnitude 
representations.6
If you continue standing in this position in the room, facing the distant wall, and 
close your eyes, you will still have a representation of how far the wall is away 
from you, and you can update your position representation by sensing your own 
body movement (Quirk, Muller, … Kubie, 1990). You can also use this 
representation of path and distance to guide your actions. Now, with your eyes 
closed, you can start walking at a slow and comfortable pace toward the distant 
wall, and you can keep going with your eyes closed until you gently bump into 
the wall (it is fine to walk with your hands out in front of you). What you will 
experience along the way is that you gradually have a worse and worse sense of 
how far you’ve walked. You may start to feel a little tingle of nervousness as you 
walk. What is happening (and this is, admittedly, just my prediction based on my 
own sensations and my reading of the literature—because this exact experiment 
has not been done systematically—but see, e.g., Schwartz, 1999, Figure 5 and 
Durgin, Akagi, Gallistel, … Haiken, 2009 for something close) is that the hump of 
activation that represents your position in space, and the hump that represents 
distance, are becoming more diffuse—wider humps. This type of increase in 
spread of activation in the position coding neurons  (p.180) is exactly what 
happens in rats when running in a familiar arena with the lights turned off 
compared to turned on—their representational humps get wider and more 
diffuse (Zhang, Schönfeld, Wiskott, … Manahan-Vaughan, 2014). Because you do 
not have visual sensory input as you move through the room, your 
representation of where you are takes on a larger and larger SD. So, as you walk 
toward the wall, the SD of the hump that is coding your own approximate 
position in space becomes wider and wider.
And here is the crucial observation: During the moments when your 
representations of position and distance are becoming wider and wider, when 
you are walking toward the wall, you do not also come to expect that your body 
will eventually gradually sink into the wall. You do not believe that your actual 
position in space has become more diffuse. You do not experience this event as if 
your body position has become diffuse and fuzzy. You fully expect that you will 
hit the wall at some point, near instantaneously, but you just don’t know when 
you will hit it. You experience that you have one and only one position in space, 
but you just aren’t sure which position that is.
What might this thought experiment suggest to us about how best to understand 
the hump-like representations of the analog magnitude systems of, say, Figure 
10.1? Consistent with this thought experiment, I believe that your “noisy, hump-
like” spatial representations (in this exercise, and at all times) generate two 
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independent signals for your mind (and that two similar signals are generated by 
each magnitude representation, e.g., of number, area, duration). The first signal 
is an estimate of the value for your position variable. This is an estimate within 
(what may be) a completely precise representational content. It is not a fuzzy set 
of values or a range of values. Your mind represents that you have one and only 
one position. Any “fuzziness” in this representation does not amount to a fuzzy 
position. Rather, the hump indicates your possible/likely positions, with only one 
position being the true state of affairs.7,8
The second signal generated from this noisy hump-like representation is an 
estimate of your epistemic limitations for knowing this single precise position. 
This signal is generated from the width of the hump (roughly speaking), and it is 
independent of the position signal.9 For example, the same value for a distance 
estimate between you and the wall (e.g., around 10 feet away) can be made 
more or less certain by, for instance, changing the external noise in the signal 
(e.g., by closing your eyes, or making the room foggy, one can make the hump 
wider or narrower).
The width of the hump is a signal of current epistemic limitations (e.g., more or 
less certain) and not a signal of fuzzy content or fuzzy beliefs. Similarly, the 
overlap between two hump-like representations is a signal of epistemic 
limitation for knowing the order between the humps and not a signal of a fuzzy 
ordering, or of no ordering at all.
Thus, when we inspect the bell-shaped representations of number in Figure 
10.1, or in the heat-map positional representations of the hippocampus, or in 
analog magnitude representations of area, length, and duration, we should be 
thinking of epistemic limitations and not errors. The “noise” in all of these 
representations is not a shortcoming of analog magnitudes. Rather, it is an 
effective solution to the challenge of tuning a sensor  (p.181) to indicate a 
precise value along a dimension while simultaneously indexing the epistemic 
limitations for knowing this value.
Some Impacts of Epistemic Limitations and One True Value
This change—from understanding the nature of our analog magnitude 
representations as infused with error to understanding them as indexing the 
epistemic limitations for a precise estimate—can have profound implications for 
how such representations factor into conceptual change stories. These 
implications derive from the two central components of this re-understanding: 1) 
a commitment to one true value, and 2) a sense of epistemic limitations. Here, I 
gesture at some implications for a few relevant topics. For some of these topics, 
I think the first steps may be already coming into focus (e.g., how epistemic 
signals can guide learning). But for others, I think there is still much work to be 
done to elaborate how the re-understood analog magnitude systems may 
contribute to our theories (e.g., of learning the integers).
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On the Increased Relevance of the ANS
A central claim from this analysis is the suggestion that analog magnitude 
systems engender a commitment to one true value about the outside world. That 
is, even when we are uncertain about our estimates (e.g., uncertain of exactly 
how far we are from the wall) we remain resolute that there is one true value for 
this distance, and we experience the internal spread in our representations as 
indicating our own level of uncertainty about what that one value is. A 
commitment to one true value may impact a host of learning stories, increasing 
the potential relevance of the analog magnitudes for other aspects of higher 
cognition, in that it bars “noise” from affecting content (e.g., it blocks vagueness 
from being introduced into the content of analog magnitude representations).
In the domain of number, theories involving error-prone representations, or 
failures to represent the numerical distinction between close numbers (e.g., see 
earlier discussion), may lead to the suggestion that there exists only a partial 
ordering among analog magnitude representations. What this means is that the 
sense of numerical order generated by such representations will require a notion 
of no order in addition to greater than and less than. For example, an animal 
whose ANS content involved error may have an ANS that cannot distinguish 
whether 8 or 9 is greater (e.g., see suggestions presented earlier). This animal 
may have a sense of numerical order that supports thoughts such as “9 > 5” and 
“8 < 12,” but not “9 > 8.” As several authors have suggested, a partial ordering 
such as this causes difficulties for using such representations to support 
hypotheses about large exact numbers (e.g., see arguments in Carey, 2009 and 
Beck, 2012).
Understanding the bell-shaped representations of Figure 10.1 to depict 
epistemic limitations with a commitment to one true value makes a significant 
change to such theories.  (p.182) This is because a commitment to one true 
value allows for well-ordered representations, and well-ordered representations 
can support more robust inferences across numbers. For example, a learner with 
a well-ordered ANS could form the commitment, “Every ANS estimate divides 
the number space into those values that are less than the estimate, those values 
that are greater than the estimate, and no others.” This is analogous to a 
commitment that “every position I can take along my path between the starting 
point and the wall will divide that path into the space ahead of me, the space 
behind me, and no others.” Such postulates can form a basis for learning and 
conceptual change across numbers. For theorizing, work remains to be done to 
provide detailed proposals of what inductive generalizations may be formed and 
extended to all numbers, and how these may factor into conceptual change 
stories (e.g., the integers, the successor function).
For empirical work, determining which numerical commitments our 
epistemically limited ANS supports will be an important goal towards 
understanding its relevance to various learning stories. For example, does the 
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ANS support our earliest intuitions about ordinal comparisons, and is this true 
for both “small” and “large” numbers? Does the ANS fail to provide an intuitive 
initial understanding of the integer concepts while still promoting a commitment 
to one true value? Do observers intuitively seek to gather more samples of 
evidence when attempting to discriminate between two quantities very close in 
number? This is merely a listing of some of the areas that may be amenable to 
research.
Also, an important assay of analog representation will continue to be behavioral 
performance that accords with the psychophysical law. Studies of early number 
discrimination, and ordinal judgments, may reveal behaviors consistent with the 
psychophysical law (e.g., curves like those in Figure 10.2 that run smoothly 
through the origin) or violations of the law (e.g., dropping to chance 
performance before reaching the origin). Where violations occur, we will need to 
explore the reasons for these violations (e.g., a failure of motivation on difficult 
trials) or consider a new model—one distinct from Weber’s law. Notice also that 
some results, like a drop in performance on difficult trials, may be evidence for 
the proposal that observers’ decisions are impacted by epistemic limitations—
that is, while an observer’s ANS representations might noisily distinguish close 
numbers, the observer might be severely in doubt due to epistemic limitations 
and may thus give up on the trial. “Giving up” is related to epistemic notions 
while “cannot (in principle) distinguish” is a claim about content.
On Constructing the Integers
The challenge of accessing the integer concepts during development has held a 
particular interest in recent years. It is a difficult puzzle, and I will not attempt a 
positive proposal for how children solve it, but I will gesture at a few relevant 
points.
The first point is that several authors have drawn upon notions of error and 
noise when rejecting the relevance of the ANS to learning the integers (e.g., 
consider discussion earlier about the failure of the ANS to distinguish higher 
consecutive integers). As we have  (p.183) discussed, this is an inaccurate 
understanding of the psychophysical law—in theory, and in practice, humans and 
nonhumans alike have the competence to represent the differences between 
consecutive integers (e.g., Figure 10.2). This competence (and the related 
understanding that numbers are well-ordered) has the potential to support 
relevant inductive inferences across all numbers, but, admittedly, the details of 
such proposals remain to be revealed.
For theorizing, it will be valuable to explore the generalizations that may be 
made possible for the learner by including a commitment to one true value 
within our analog systems. There is much thinking still to be done here, and 
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additional representations (such as object files, sets of objects, one, successor, 
etc.) may be necessary ingredients for building integer representations.
For empirical work, continuing to investigate children’s early commitments 
about number before they have become sophisticated counters may be 
particularly revealing. For example, do children maintain a commitment that 
“every number divides the number space into those values that are less than the 
value, those values that are greater than the value, and no others?” And can it 
be shown that such a commitment is supported by ANS representations?
On Interfacing the Integers with the Magnitudes
One challenging problem is determining how the eventual correspondence 
between the integer concepts and the representations of the ANS is negotiated. 
It has been suggested by some that the ANS (and one might expect other analog 
magnitudes) might best be described using the real numbers. This may be 
related to the notion that analog magnitudes are continuous (Gallistel … 
Gelman, 2000). In contrast, some have suggested that neither number nor time 
can be represented in a truly continuous, dense format (Laurence … Margolis, 
2005)—they perhaps are represented at some grain size finer than the unitizer 
of the integers (e.g., finer discrete bins than “1, 2, 3. . .”). If the grain size of 
analog magnitudes is smaller than the unit size (e.g., “1”), a puzzle remains for 
how our unitized notions are brought into concert with these representations. 
Approaches to this problem have included suggesting mechanisms that might 
bin ANS representations into discrete response regions (Gallistel … Gelman, 
1992; Izard … Dehaene, 2008) or invoking notions like one, successor, or 
multiplicative identity to force the bell-shaped noise of ANS representations into 
discrete ordered units of numerosity (Leslie, Gallistel … Gelman, 2008a, b). 
These are interesting approaches. Given that this correspondence problem 
requires navigating two vocabularies (e.g., discrete integers and fine-grained 
numerosities), even if we remove the notion of noisy content from our 
understanding of the ANS, I doubt that this alone will solve the challenge of how 
children access the integers, the successor function, and other important 
generalizations across numbers such as the mapping of integers to magnitudes. 
That is, other representations may be required, as well as a more nuanced 
learning story.
 (p.184) On the Invitation to Learn
On a more practical side, a commitment to one true value and an experience of 
epistemic limitations may dramatically recast learning problems that involve the 
analog magnitude systems. For example, imagine that our ANS presented us 
with fuzzy content. Then, by this system’s lights, there would be no right answer
for the question of how many dots are before my eyes. There is just a probability 
density function of truthiness—a “blur on the number line”, for example, sort-of-
nineish-and-also-sixish-and. . . In contrast, for the epistemically limited learner 
with a commitment to one true value, there is one right answer for each 
Epistemic Limitations and Precise Estimates in Analog Magnitude Representation
Page 15 of 24
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All 
Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.  
Subscriber: Johns Hopkins University; date: 14 February 2020
experienced numerosity, and the fuzz usefully tracks their confidence in their 
estimate of that answer. The epistemic limits indexed by analog representations 
may inspire learners rather than dissuade them. For the case of number, an 
experience of the epistemic limitations in the ANS may inspire a learner to ask, 
“What is the right answer for this number of dots that I’m having so much 
trouble estimating? Is there another way to find the right answer?”
I suspect that a commitment to one true value and epistemic limitations play a 
large role in motivating learners to approach learning problems in the first 
place. Indeed, a combination of epistemic limitations and a commitment to one 
true value may present us with an invitation to learn. For number, this drive to 
search for another way to understand the right answer may culminate in the 
creation of the integer concepts and their interface with the magnitudes.
On Building a Commitment to One True Value
Given that the dominant understanding of analog magnitude systems in recent 
history has promoted representations that are inherently noisy and approximate, 
perhaps the most unfamiliar idea in my proposal is the notion of a commitment 
to one true value. One might ask where such a commitment comes from. The 
classic answers are that it is either innate—that is, central to how the system 
operates and always present—or it is learned through experience via some 
mechanism. What might a possible learning mechanism be? I will gesture at two 
(though I suspect that a commitment to one true value may be inherent to how 
these systems operate).
When we consider how one might acquire a commitment that, say, objects have 
exact (i.e., non-fuzzy) positions in space, we are reminded that our distance 
estimates (qua analog magnitudes) become fuzzier as we move further away 
from objects (Allison, Gillam, … Vecellio, 2009). While such a dependency 
between our movement and the fuzziness of our estimates will present a 
challenge for a learning story that begins by positing fuzzy-positional-content for 
things in the world,10 it might be used as a source of evidence for an 
epistemically limited learner along the path to constructing a commitment to 
one true value.
Because of such dependencies, through our own actions (e.g., walking closer, 
squinting our eyes or moving them, internally changing a scaling factor) we may 
experience that  (p.185) our epistemic limitations are not fixed—the spread in 
the humps of our magnitude representations are not static. Notice that this 
requires us to note the sameness (e.g., the mean of our distance estimate) in the 
face of our changing epistemic state (e.g., the SD of our distance estimate). If 
this were possible, it may allow our experience, over time, to give rise to a 
commitment that these are merely noisy estimates of some true external value.11
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Another source of evidence for one true value from epistemic limitations might 
be multimodal representations. Having two magnitude representations each 
grounding out in the same external stimulus (e.g., vision and touch attempting to 
determine how long an object is) may provide us with some agreement in their 
estimate, and also some disagreement in the epistemic certainty they yield (e.g., 
a sharper, more certain representation of the length of the object from vision 
than from touch [Ernst … Banks, 2002]). Such experiences of differing levels of 
epistemic limitation could give rise to the understanding that the length itself is 
something stable and external to the mind that these systems are attempting to 
estimate.12
Alternatively, it may be that the commitment to the existence of one true value is 
an immediate and permanent aspect of our magnitude representations from the 
get-go.13
On Learning across Multiple Timescales
Epistemic limitations may also be useful to observers in other ways and across 
multiple timescales. For example, within a single display time (e.g., 1000 msec), 
it may be that epistemic signals guide the learner to adjust behavior over 
hundreds of milliseconds in order to improve the resulting representation (e.g., 
moving closer to the object to estimate distance; shifting fixation to a crowded 
area of dots to better estimate their numerosity).
Over the course of tens of trials (or learning problems within a classroom), 
epistemic signals may help scaffold the learner toward better decisions and 
more accurate behaviors. In recent work, we have found that beginning with 
numerical discriminations that are easier (i.e., trials for which the observer has 
higher confidence about the correct answer) and building toward more difficult 
trials leads children to have a better sense of the distinctions between stimuli, 
resulting in improved performance throughout the task (Odic, Hock, … 
Halberda, 2014).
At still longer timescales, we are finding that manipulating internal confidence 
in ANS representations can transfer to school math performance, even on 
problems using discrete number symbols rather than nonsymbolic arrays (Wang, 
Odic, Halberda, … Feigenson, 2015). We also believe that longer-term changes 
in how children respond to their own internal confidence may contribute to 
developmental changes in ANS precision.
At the timescale of a whole life, it may be the sum total of such experiences with 
epistemic signals (and the successful or failed attempts to adjust behavior based 
on these signals) that forms the basis for our trait-like attributions (e.g., “I’m not 
a math person”).
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There remains much work to do in integrating the insights we are gaining about 
epistemic signals into how we understand learning problems and their solutions. 
Because  (p.186) epistemic signals may be used (and have impact) across many 
timescales, there is also the possibility of using epistemic signals to serve as a 
unifying concept for both theorizing and empirical work.
Conclusions
I began this chapter by motivating a consideration of how we understand the 
bell-shaped representations of Figure 10.1. Do we think that the representation 
of ANS9 is less precise than the representation of ANS5? I suggested that we are 
at risk for misunderstanding the “noise” in analog magnitude representations as 
a limitation in the content of those representations. For example, some authors 
have suggested that the distinction between ANS8 and ANS9 is not represented 
at all. I showed that such a view is at odds with the human and animal data in 
discrimination tasks. Instead, I argued that the variability in our analog 
magnitude representations is better understood to be a signal of our epistemic 
limitation for our estimates and discriminations. I believe this proposal provides 
a satisfactory account of performance failures, and also of our deep commitment 
to there being one true value for any given magnitude out in the world. Finally, I 
closed by starting to consider how such an adjustment might affect some 
theoretical and empirical work involving analog magnitude representations.
In sum, my suggestion is that number, distance, time, area, volume, brightness, 
and many other psychological dimensions are represented by well-ordered 
analog magnitude representations, which provide an estimate of one true value 
along with a signal of the epistemic limitations for knowing this value. Progress 
remains to be made in understanding how these representations may play a role 
in some aspects of higher-level cognition (like constructing integer 
representations). There is also progress to be made in characterizing the 
foundational nature of the representations themselves. I hope this has been a 
useful step.
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Notes:
(1.) Systematicity of thought is the proposal that our ability to entertain certain 
thoughts (e.g., “8 is greater than 6”) is related, straightforwardly, to our ability 
to entertain some other thoughts (e.g., “9 is greater than 6,” and “8 is greater 
than 5”) and not others (e.g., “I like sailing”). Systematicity, it is argued, is 
related to the productivity of thought (Fodor … Pylyshyn, 1988). The suggestion 
from Beck is that analog magnitudes may not be systematic in this way (Beck, 
2012).
(2.) One case where this type of “drop to chance before ratio 1” violation has 
been reported is in a numerical discrimination task from Halberda and 
Feigenson (2008), in which children were tested with a wide variety of ratios. In 
this case, we observed that the large number of highly difficult trials led many 
children to become discouraged and give up on the task when a trial seemed too 
hard. Notice that “giving up” is a performance issue and does not reflect 
competence. This type of giving up can be an interesting matter to investigate in 
its own right. For instance, we have since found that an observer’s internal 
confidence can be affected by trial order and trial difficulty (Odic, Hock, … 
Halberda, 2014). One implication of this is that confidence, as experienced via 
ANS representations, may play an important role in mediating school math 
performance. That is, a change in a child’s internal confidence in their ANS 
representations can help or hinder their later school math performance (Wang, 
Odic, Halberda, … Feigenson, 2015). There is much work still to be done in this 
area.
(3.) This is not to say that infants will perform as well as adults do; there are 
genuine developmental improvements in ANS performance. What changes over 
development is the steepness of the curves (e.g., in Figure 10.2). I believe it is a 
promising area for future work to determine what underlies these age-related 
improvements and how we should best interpret them. The improved behavioral 
performance (e.g., in judging that 12 dots is more than 9) suggests that infants 
and children are getting better, sharper estimates with age and/or practice. Our 
recent work also suggests that such children experience higher internal 
confidence as this sharpness improves (Odic et al., 2014). Future neuroscientific 
evidence could be relevant as well—for example, one might find increased 
numbers of neurons in the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) or increased frontoparietal 
connectivity. All of these are consistent with the understanding that variability in 
ANS representations is indexing epistemic limitations rather than fuzzy content 
(see argument in main text). The details matter, and these questions present 
exciting possibilities for exploration.
(4.) Here I leave open whether magnitude representations alone can support 
integer thoughts like “8.”
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(5.) Some authors have suggested that analog magnitude representations are 
the complete hump-like curves depicted in Figure 10.1, such that an instance of 
viewing, say, nine objects in a collection gives rise to a hump of activation 
centered on ANS9. This can occur either because the ANS representations are 
themselves analog transforms of earlier analog signals (Dehaene … Changeux, 
1993) that may even vary dynamically in time (e.g., imagine a vibrating wave-
hump of activation that is constantly shaking a little bit, moving up and down the 
line, and getting thinner and fatter due to changes in incoming stimulation). 
Alternatively, the representations may be full humps of activation because the 
read-out of a discrete representation is subject to some noise (Gallistel, Gelman, 
… Cordes, 2006). In contrast, other authors have suggested that activations 
within analog magnitudes are discrete individual samples (e.g., a bar of precise 
activation on the mental number line) and that the humps only become 
observable when the discrete samples are averaged across many instances (e.g., 
Meck … Church, 1983). I believe that what I argue here applies equally well to 
any of these hypothesized representations, since all will need to address how 
noise should be understood in the system and by the animal. Personally, I like 
imagining fully moveable vibrating humps (all of them subject to a scaling 
factor) and so I will continue discussing representations that look like the humps 
in Figure 10.1. I will argue that even these complete humps are best understood 
to implement a perfectly precise number estimate with a signal of epistemic 
limitation, and not a fuzzy spread-out number thought.
(6.) I’ll note that Weber’s law may hold for our distance estimates (e.g., how far 
is the wall from me) but not necessarily for our spatial position estimates per se 
(e.g., my position is x,y). For my argument, I believe the phenomenon of interest 
(e.g., uncertainty of distance) emerges from an analog magnitude representation 
of the distance from me to the wall (cf Cheng, Srinivasan, … Zhang, 1999). I will 
include references to neuronal data for position as well, partly because this is 
the most developed literature in the vicinity of my argument, and because the 
images and notions this literature has developed (e.g., place fields) are, I think, 
valuable for fueling our intuitions about what might be happening in the head as 
we move around. In fact, distance estimates are an important part of the input to 
the place cells (e.g., Jeffery, 2007), and so place cells may help us understand 
how our analog magnitude distance representations fuel later representations of 
position, even if position representations themselves are not bona fide analog 
magnitudes.
(7.) The level of granularity for each analog magnitude dimension is an open 
question of interest, but that granularity is not affected by a JND or the SD of 
the humps—by the argument I am suggesting here, these factors are about 
epistemic limitations, not content granularity.
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(8.) I believe I can run a very similar argument if the magnitude representation 
in question is dense and continuous rather than organized in discrete bins. I do 
not wish to choose between these possibilities here. I believe an understanding 
of epistemic limitations will be important for whichever way we understand the 
underlying content.
(9.) Modulo dependencies like Weber’s law. But note, such dependencies do not 
violate the well-orderedness of the values on the magnitude scales and so do not 
conflict with the point I am making here.
(10.) Indeed, a theory about analog magnitude representations that takes the 
humps to be humps in content (e.g., fuzzy content) may be positioning the 
animal to face a learning problem akin to those conceived by Piaget (1955), Mill 
(1865), and James’ blooming buzzing confusion (1890/1983). That is, if the 
contents of these representations are fuzzy, diffuse, and inexact, then why don’t 
we believe the world to be fuzzy, diffuse, and inexact? This would seem to be a 
straightforward extrapolation from the experience of an animal with fuzzy 
content. Under the model we are discussing here, the analog magnitude 
machines always and only generate “noisy humps.” They never provide exact 
discrete “hash marks.” So taking those fuzzy humps to indicate fuzzy content 
will position the animal to face the learning problem of going from fuzzy-hump-
thoughts to precise-hashmark-ideas. As Piaget, Mill, James, and subsequent 
attempts reveal, this is a hard learning problem to say the least.
(11.) Note, this is similar to John Stuart Mill’s (1865) argument for the role of 
our own actions in birthing a commitment to the permanent possibilities of 
perception, thereby giving rise to our belief in a mind-independent enduring 
external world.
(12.) This argument could include a learning piece that is similar to Lord 
Berkeley’s (1709/1910) proposal for how touch could teach vision to represent 
distance from eye-muscle strain. However, in the case of one true value, it may 
be more like two limited systems (e.g., touch and vision) giving rise to a new 
idea about the external world (e.g., that there is one true distance for the object) 
rather than one “perfect” system guiding the other. If one were interested in this 
type of learning story, it would also be good to become acquainted with the 
results from studies of multimodal cue combination, which suggest that we 
combine evidence from both modalities (e.g., touch and vision), subject to the 
internal confidence in each representation (e.g., Burge, Girshick, … Banks, 2010;
Ernst … Banks, 2002).
(13.) I must admit that I prefer to think that a commitment to one true value may 
be a principle that is required by the combinatorics of the language of thought; 
and, perhaps even earlier, may have its ancestor in the first sensory motor 
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transforms of living organisms. Of course, such speculations leave us with much 
work to do to determine how this might be so.
